In the context of a discussion on induction, it is a
reasonable thing to ask what a piece of inductive reasoning looks
like. What is it about it that specifically makes it appropriate
to call it "inductive"?

This argument:

This A is B, 
This A is B, .... 
----------------- 
All As are Bs

or even

This A is B, 
This A is B, ....
 --------------------- 
Probably As are Bs

is, at least, some sort of recognizable pattern of an argument
that can be called *inductive* to contrast it with a deductive
argument like

This A is a B 
This A is a B
 --------- 
Some As are Bs

The idea here is that people think there are perfectly good
arguments like the above that are not deductive and so let's call
them inductive!

But they are not *good* arguments at all, they never are, no
matter how many cases are piled up in the premises. It is not
just that they are not deductive, it is that they do not seem to
have any *reasoning power*, there seems not even a *weak* force
between the premises and the conclusion.

Reasoning power? I refer to the power that avoids The Gambler's
Fallacy. You see, no matter how many times a penny comes up
tails, it does not follow in any way at all that it will come up
tails on the next throw. It is not even probable! Nor is the
likelihood of heads any better. There is no reasoning connection
between the premise data and the conclusion.

Some people say that there is a more sophisticated idea of
induction that does not involve the above simplistic patterns.
OK. I am listening. What are these more sophisticated ideas that
identify something aptly to be called induction? It is no use
merely pointing to the various things scientists do because they
do too many things! The inductive bit gets lost in the haze!

Some people have thought to say that scientists *induce* things
by thinking up  patterns that the data in the premises of so
called inductive arguments suggest to their minds. But the
trouble with this is that this does not make for any actual
argument. Patterns are sometimes ten a penny. Any finite set of
data points, any number of so called inductive premises likely
fit an infinite number of possible patterns. It is often a
remarkable achievement for humans to even think of one! But that
act of thinking up a pattern, a possible theory, is not any kind
of persuasive *argument* in itself. That may well be called part
of a man's efforts to think through a scientific problem, it
might even loosely called reasoning. But that bit in itself is
not any persuasive forceful reasoning.

That scientist X thinks up one pattern and scientist Y thinks up
another contrary pattern can be described  as both of them
inducing different things from the data. But there is nothing in
this kind of psychological induction to say the least thing about
whether one is good *reasoning* and the other bad.

It is just a psychological trick that trained and gifted
scientists get up to! The testing of theories is the main game 
but that game is a game of deduction.